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HYPOTHESIZING A SMALL OPIOID MDL SETTLEMENT: AN 
ARGUMENT FOR LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION AND 
LESSONS FROM BIG TOBACCO 
ABSTRACT 
In response to the opioid epidemic, counties and cities across the United 
States waged In re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, better known as the 
opioid MDL, against manufacturers and distributors of opioids. The county and 
city plaintiffs appear to have taken their litigation strategy straight from Big 
Tobacco playbook of the 1990s. This is to the great disdain of state attorneys 
general, who fronted Big Tobacco litigation with state-sponsored parens patriae 
litigation. 
The state attorneys general vehemently assert that the MDL claims are the 
province of state governments rather than local governments. However, the 
attorney general-led Big Tobacco litigation of the 1990s left much to be desired. 
While the states were able to procure a $206 billion tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement in 1998, a seemingly enormous win for tobacco victims, the state 
attorneys general allocated a devastatingly low amount of the proceeds to the 
intended purposes of smoking cessation programs and public health initiatives. 
Just like Big Tobacco litigation, a global opioid settlement purported to resolve 
the MDL claims seems inevitable—and states are eager to undermine local 
efforts in reaching a settlement. 
This Note argues that state attorneys general should not be permitted to 
overthrow settlement negotiations in the county-and-city-led opioid MDL, 
positioning that counties and cities are better suited than states to implement 
evidence-based public health initiates in their own communities. Spending 
shortfalls of the Master Settlement Agreement demonstrate precisely why 
allocating settlement money to the states guarantees little to no spending 
accountability. This Note further identifies three reasons why, despite many 
similarities in the litigation tactics between tobacco and opioids, a global opioid 
settlement agreement will be far smaller than the $206 billion tobacco Master 
Settlement Agreement of 1998. Therefore, a smaller settlement would be best 
utilized by apportioning settlement proceeds directly to the local governments, 
which are the most impacted by the opioid epidemic. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
What’s happening in our country with the opioid crisis is present and ongoing. I 
did a little math. Since we’re losing more than 50,000 of our citizens every year, 
about 150 Americans are going to die today, just today, while we’re meeting. 
And in my humble opinion, everyone shares some of the responsibility, and no 
one has done enough to abate it. That includes the manufacturers . . . the doctors, 
the federal government and state government, local hospitals, third-party payors, 
and individuals. . . . So my objective is to do something meaningful to abate the 
crisis and to do it in 2018.1 
On December 12, 2017, the panel for multidistrict litigation created In re: 
National Prescription Opiate Litigation (the opioid MDL) by transferring sixty-
four personal injury cases against opioid manufacturers and distributors to Judge 
Dan Polster in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.2 
These consolidated cases turn on theories that (1) opioid manufacturers, namely 
Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of OxyContin, misrepresented the addictive 
nature of long-term opioid use for persons with chronic pain, and (2) opioid 
distributors failed to adequately monitor suspicious orders of opioids.3 By 
September 2019, the opioid MDL had expanded to include over 2,500 individual 
lawsuits filed by United States counties and cities against manufacturers, 
distributors, and pharmacies.4 
Judge Polster’s goal is for the parties to reach an effective settlement 
agreement, and he wanted to do it back in 2018.5 As Judge Polster informed all 
parties in the opioid MDL, “What [going to trial] will accomplish, I don’t know. 
But I’d rather not do that.”6 “People aren’t interested in depositions, and 
discovery, and trials.”7 Judge Polster is disinterested in allowing procedural 
hockey to play out in his chambers, as early case management orders clarified 
that trial would not be moved because of procedural delay.8 Moreover, in all 
 
 1. Transcript of Proceedings at 4:1-12, 4:24-25, In re: National Prescription Opiate 
Litigation, No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (Jan. 9, 2018) (No. 58) [hereinafter MDL No. 2804]. On 
January 9, 2018, Judge Dan Polster addressed all parties and strongly suggested that with all of 
these “smart people here and their clients,” he was confident the parties could abate the opioid 
epidemic through effective negotiation tactics. Id. at 5:3-6. 
 2. Transfer Order at 1, 3, MDL No. 2804 (Dec. 12, 2017) (No. 1). 
 3. See generally, e.g., MDL 2804: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, U.S. DISTRICT 
CT. FOR NORTHERN DISTRICT OHIO, https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804 (last visited Apr. 
11, 2020). 
 4. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class at 1–2, 12, MDL No. 2804 (Sept. 11, 
2019) (No. 2590). 
 5. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 4:24-25, 6:12-13. 
 6. Id. at 6:9-10. 
 7. Id. at 4:19-20. 
 8. Case Management Order No. 1 at 17, MDL No. 2804 (Apr. 11, 2018) (No. 232) (stating 
the granting of an extension of discovery “shall not change the trial date, and the Court does not 
intend to move the trial date of the Track One case(s).”) (emphasis omitted). However, trial was 
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cases, Judge Polster ordered both plaintiff and defense counsel to select six 
attorneys to represent their respective clients in negotiations.9 The push for 
settlement reached new heights on September 11, 2019, when Judge Polster 
certified a first-of-its-kind “Negotiation Class” under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 as a means of encouraging a global settlement between a class of 
forty-nine plaintiff representatives and thirteen defendants on behalf of every 
county and city in the United States.10  
The push for settlement appears to be working. On September 15, 2019, just 
four days after certification of the Negotiation Class, Purdue Pharma announced 
its proposed settlement agreement in the opioid MDL.11 The terms of the 
settlement included a filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the Sackler family 
relinquishing control of the company, and the company agreeing to pay out a 
minimum of $3 billion to plaintiffs over the next seven years.12 Then, on October 
20, 2019, the eve of the first trial set in the opioid MDL, four companies—Teva, 
Cardinal Health, AmerisourceBergen, and McKesson—settled with both Track 
One bellwether plaintiffs Summit and Cuyahoga Counties in Ohio for $260 
million.13 Yet another opioid manufacturer proposed settlement in February 
2020, when Mallinckrodt PLC announced it was finalizing a settlement proposal 
worth at least $1.6 billion and which included a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.14 
Between Judge Polster’s push for global settlement and companies settling 
along the way, a global settlement purported to resolve all pending cases seems 
inevitable. The logical comparison may be with Big Tobacco litigation of the 
1990s, which culminated with the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998, the 
 
nonetheless postponed to October 21, 2019, and the original three-week trial now stands at eight 
weeks, with closing arguments set for December 13, 2019. Case Management Order No. 8 at 1–2, 
MDL No. 2804 (Jan. 29, 2019) (No. 1306); Civil Jury Trial Order at 3, MDL No. 2804 (May 1, 
2019) (No. 1598). 
 9. Minutes of 1/31/18 Settlement Conference & Scheduling Order at 1–2, MDL No. 2804 
(Feb. 2, 2018) (No. 111). 
 10. Order Certifying Negotiation Class & Approving Notice at 3, MDL No. 2804 (Sept. 11, 
2019) (No. 2591). 
 11. Restructure: Purdue Pharma Announces Agreement in Principle on Landmark Opioid 
Litigation Settlement, PURDUE PHARMA (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.purduepharma.com/ 
restructure/. 
 12. Jan Hoffman & Mary Williams Walsh, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin, Files for 
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/health/purdue-
pharma-bankruptcy-opioids-settlement.html. 
 13. Opioid MDL Track One Cases Settle on Eve of Openings, Joe Rice Leads Negotiations, 
MOTLEY RICE LLC (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.motleyrice.com/article/opioid-mdl-track-one-
settlement. 
 14. Alexander Gladstone et al., Mallinckrodt Pitches at Least $1.6 Billion Opioid Settlement, 
Generics Unit Bankruptcy, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
mallinckrodt-enters-creditor-talks-ahead-of-potential-generics-bankruptcy-11582572100. 
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largest civil settlement in United States history that resulted in a $206 billion 
award for state attorney general plaintiffs.15  
One striking difference in the opioid MDL, however, is the significant role 
of county and city plaintiffs. This is to the great disdain of nearly forty state 
attorneys general, many of whom are pursuing their own state-level claims, who 
fervently assert the claims of the MDL are the province of the states and not the 
local governments.16 Judge Polster has found that if the attorneys general believe 
they in fact control jurisdiction, then those attorneys general could attempt to 
foreclose the claims directly.17 Yet no attorneys general have attempted to shut 
down the local governments’ cases.18 Judge Polster asserts that until that 
happens, he cannot “pretend” that the more than 2,000 separate actions filed by 
counties and cities simply do not exist in his courtroom.19 
This Note argues that state attorneys general should not be permitted to 
overthrow settlement negotiations in the county-and-city-led opioid MDL, 
positing that counties and cities are better suited than states to implement 
evidence-based public health initiates in their own communities. Spending 
shortfalls of the Master Settlement Agreement demonstrate precisely why 
allocating settlement money to the states guarantees little to no accountability. 
Moreover, this Note identifies three reasons why, despite many similarities in 
the litigation tactics between tobacco and opioids, a global opioid settlement 
agreement will be far smaller than the $206 billion tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement of 1998. Therefore, a smaller settlement would be best utilized by 
apportioning settlement proceeds directly to the local governments, which are 
the most directly impacted by the opioid epidemic.  
Part II discusses the background of tobacco litigation and opioid litigation. 
Part III identifies three reasons why a global opioid MDL settlement will be far 
smaller than the $206 billion tobacco Master Settlement Agreement of 1998. 
Part IV argues why counties and cities are better suited than states to implement 
community-based public health initiatives, and it discusses examples of local 
public health initiatives that have proven successful. Finally, Part V concludes 
this Note, further reiterating that state attorneys general should not appropriate 
MDL negotiations. 
 
 15. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
(1998); Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers and States Draft a $206 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
14, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/14/us/cigarette-makers-and-states-draft-a-206-bil 
lion-deal.html. 
 16. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 31. 
 17. Id. at 31–32. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 32. 
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II.  BACKGROUND OF TOBACCO LITIGATION AND OPIOID LITIGATION 
A. History of Tobacco Litigation 
In the early 1990s, the tobacco industry boasted an almost half-century 
record of having never paid a dime to a single plaintiff who brought suit against 
it.20 Big Tobacco’s litigation strategy was aggressive and straightforward: refuse 
to settle a single case.21 The industry relied largely on its ability to “wear down” 
plaintiffs in the pretrial process through intimidation and delay.22 The tobacco 
industry vigorously denied the claim that smoking causes cancer, which required 
plaintiffs’ counsel, generally paid on contingency fee bases, to bear heavy front-
loaded costs in retaining experts to rebut the tobacco companies’ experts.23 Big 
Tobacco teamed up with big law firms to argue endless pretrial motions, take up 
procedural challenges, and take depositions until most plaintiffs were forced to 
drop their cases before the claims could even make it to trial.24  
That all changed in 1994. That year, Mississippi Attorney General Mike 
Moore joined with plaintiff’s attorneys to file an unprecedented parens patriae25 
suit on behalf of Mississippi citizens for Medicaid-related expenses arising out 
of smoking-related illnesses.26 In the following years, forty other state attorneys 
general followed suit.27 These cases sought equitable relief under claims of 
 
 20. See Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco 
Litigation, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 904–05 (1998). From the 1950s to 1995, smokers and their 
families filed over 700 product liability suits against the tobacco industry. Id. Only one case, 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988), resulted in a jury award for 
the plaintiffs. Id. at 905; On appeal, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 583 (3d Cir. 
1990), the Third Circuit overturned the $400,000 jury award, thus preserving the industry’s perfect 
record of having never paid any money to a single plaintiff. Id. 
 21. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
853, 857–58 (1992). 
 22. Michael C. Moore & Charles J. Mikhail, A New Attack on Smoking Using an Old-Time 
Remedy, 111 PUB. HEALTH REP. 192, 194 (1996). 
 23. Rabin, supra note 21, at 858. 
 24. Id. at 859. 
 25. Parens patriae literally means “parent of the country.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). To invoke a parens patriae suit, a “State must 
be more than a nominal party,” meaning it cannot merely express the interests of particular private 
parties. Id. at 607. A State must express a “quasi-sovereign interest.” Id. Quasi-sovereign interests 
fall into two general categories: (1) an “interest in the health and well-being—both physical and 
economic—of its residents in general;” or (2) an interest in “not being discriminatorily denied its 
rightful status within the federal system.” Id. Similarly, in tobacco litigation, states were able to 
demonstrate their interests in the health and well-being of its residents. See id. at 609. 
 26. Complaint at 1–2, Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. 
Ch. Ct. 1994); Michael McCann et al., Criminalizing Big Tobacco: Legal Mobilization and the 
Politics of Responsibility for Health Risks in the United States, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 288, 294 
(2013). 
 27. McCann et al., supra note 26, at 294. 
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restitution, unjust enrichment, and injunction rather than seeking to obtain 
damages for injuries suffered by the individual smoker.28 Other claims utilized 
by plaintiffs included conspiracy, fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
RICO.29 Underpinning the conspiracy claims were theories that the tobacco 
industry had manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes in order to sustain 
consumer addiction, as well as that the industry knew of the dangers of tobacco 
use but marketed cigarettes anyway.30 In 1997, four states (Mississippi, 
Minnesota, Florida, and Texas) were able to settle for $40 billion with the 
tobacco industry for costs arising out of Medicaid-related causes of action.31 The 
following year, the remaining forty-six states obtained a $206 billion Master 
Settlement Agreement with the tobacco industry, the largest civil settlement in 
U.S. history, that was to be paid out to the states over the next twenty-five 
years.32  
B. Shortfalls of the Master Settlement Agreement 
Such a groundbreaking tobacco settlement, however, left much to be 
desired. While the tobacco plaintiffs were able to obtain a $246 billion total 
award that was supposed to be used for smoking cessation campaigns and public 
health initiatives, only a small portion of that money has actually been used for 
its intended purpose.33 For example, the Government Accountability Office 
found that between fiscal years 2000 and 2005, when states received a total of 
$52.6 billion in tobacco settlement payments, states used only 3.5% of the 
proceeds for tobacco control and 30% on health care (which included spending 
for programs like Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program),34 but 
they used 22.9% for budget shortfalls, 6% on “infrastructure,” 7.1% for “general 
purposes,” 7.8% on “other,” and 11.9% was unallocated.35 In 2014, New York 
used $700,000 of the tobacco funds for a sprinkler system on a public golf 
course, and regrettably, North Carolina gave $42 million to tobacco farmers for 
 
 28. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 22, at 197. 
 29. Cliff Sherrill, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability and Claims for 
Restitution, 19 UALR L.J. 497, 506 (1997). 
 30. Id. at 507. 
 31. See also TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE MASTER SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2015); Mather, supra note 20, at 898. 
 32. See generally NAT’L ASSOC. OF ATTORNEYS GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
(1998); Meier, supra note 15. 
 33. TOBACCO FREE KIDS, BROKEN PROMISES TO OUR CHILDREN: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK 
AT THE 1998 STATE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 19 YEARS LATER 1, 139 (2017). 
 34. Nicholas Terry & Aila Hoss, Opioid Litigation Proceeds: Cautionary Tales from the 
Tobacco Settlement, HEALTH AFF. (May 23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/h 
blog20180517.992650/full/. 
 35. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES’ ALLOCATIONS 
OF PAYMENTS FROM TOBACCO COMPANIES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2005 2, 7 (2007). 
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“modernization and marketing.”36 In 2018, states were estimated to have spent 
less than three cents of every dollar in tobacco settlement revenue to actually 
help prevent tobacco use.37 
As of Fiscal Year 2019, total payments to the states from the 1998 Master 
Settlement Agreement amassed $156.7 billion.38 During those twenty years 
since the settlement, states spent just 2.6% of it on tobacco prevention and 
cessation programs.39 Currently, not a single state uses settlement funds for 
tobacco prevention programs at the CDC-recommended level.40 For Fiscal Year 
2019, the CDC-recommended level was a mere $3.3 billion out of the $27.3 
billion that states received in settlement proceeds and tobacco taxes.41 
Meanwhile, tobacco companies currently spend $9.1 billion a year—“$1 million 
every hour”—on marketing and advertising for their products.42 
C. Today’s Opioid MDL and a Brief History of Opioid Litigation 
Over twenty years after the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, Mike 
Moore is at it again, and he’s using litigation tactics straight out of the Big 
Tobacco playbook.43 Like he did in the 1990s, Moore traveled across the country 
hoping to recruit state attorneys general and plaintiffs’ firms to his pursuit 
against the pharmaceutical industry.44 That pursuit culminated with the 
launching of the opioid MDL on December 12, 2017, when the panel for 
multidistrict litigation consolidated sixty-four opioid personal injury cases and 
assigned them to Judge Dan Polster in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio.45 By August 2018, the opioid MDL had amassed 
more than 1,000 opioid-related lawsuits from over forty states against 
pharmaceutical giants such as Purdue Pharma, Mallinckrodt, and Endo 
 
 36. Jim Estes, How the Big Tobacco Deal Went Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/opinion/how-the-big-tobacco-deal-went-bad.html. 
 37. TOBACCO FREE KIDS, BROKEN PROMISES TO OUR CHILDREN: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK 
AT THE 1998 STATE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 20 YEARS LATER 1 (2018). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Broken Promises to Our Children: A State-by-State Look at the 1998 State Tobacco 
Settlement 21 Years Later, TOBACCO FREE KIDS (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org 
/what-we-do/us/statereport. 
 43. Esmé E. Deprez & Paul Barrett, The Lawyer Who Beat Big Tobacco Takes on the Opioid 
Industry, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/ 
2017-10-05/the-lawyer-who-beat-big-tobacco-takes-on-the-opioid-industry. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Transfer Order, supra note 2, at 3. 
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Pharmaceuticals.46 Only a year later, the opioid MDL stood to include well over 
2,000 individual lawsuits.47 
Plaintiffs in the opioid MDL, most of whom are United States counties or 
cities, allege that (1) the manufacturers of prescription opioids misrepresented 
to physicians the risks of long-term opioid use for patients with chronic pain, 
and (2) the distributors failed to adequately monitor, investigate, and detect 
suspicious orders of prescription opioids, all of which contributed to the current 
opioid epidemic.48 Like in tobacco litigation, causes of action in the opioid MDL 
include fraudulent concealment, RICO, civil conspiracy, negligence, various 
criminal acts, and unjust enrichment.49 
The opioid lawsuits began, however, far before the inception of the opioid 
MDL. Perhaps taking a lesson from Big Tobacco, early opioid plaintiffs 
prevailed against pharmaceutical companies in a number of multimillion-dollar 
settlements, and it is precisely because they initiated their lawsuits with 
government action. For example, in November 2004, Purdue Pharma, the 
manufacturer of OxyContin, reached a $10 million settlement with West 
Virginia after the state’s attorney general accused the company of aggressively 
marketing OxyContin and causing widespread addiction in the state.50 In May 
2007, Purdue pled guilty to criminal misbranding and agreed to pay $600 million 
in fines, in addition to paying at least $130 million to help resolve civil suits 
arising out of addiction claims.51 In 2015, Kentucky Attorney General Jack 
Conway settled a lawsuit with Purdue for $24 million,52 and New York Attorney 
General Eric Schneiderman secured a $75,000 settlement against the 
pharmaceutical giant along with the requirement that Purdue modify its 
 
 46. Bruce Japsen, Opioid Lawsuits Look More Like a Tobacco Settlement Every Day, FORBES 
(Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2018/08/25/opioid-lawsuits-looking-
more-like-tobacco-settlements-every-day/#4035d0ab4f4f. 
 47. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 48. See Transfer Order, supra note 2, at 3. 
 49. See, e.g., Opinion & Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation 
Denying Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss at 3, 6, 20, 31, 36, MDL No. 2804 (Dec. 19, 2018) (No. 
1203). 
 50. Landon Thomas Jr., Maker of OxyContin Reaches Settlement with West Virginia, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/06/business/maker-of-oxycontin-reach 
es-settlement-with-west-virginia.html. 
 51. Barry Meier, U.S. Maker of OxyContin Painkiller to Pay $600 Million in Guilty Plea, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 11, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/business/worldbusiness/11iht-oxy.1 
.5665287.html. 
 52. Kentucky Settles Lawsuit with OxyContin Maker for $24 Million, CBS NEWS (Dec. 23, 
2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kentucky-settles-lawsuit-with-oxycontin-maker-for-24-
million/. 
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marketing practices.53 These examples demonstrate the sheer power of 
spearheading health epidemic cases with government action. 
D. More Differences than Similarities Between Big Tobacco Litigation and 
the Opioid MDL 
There are, in many ways, logical links between Big Tobacco litigation of the 
1990s and today’s opioid MDL against Big Pharma. Namely, government 
plaintiffs initiated both litigation proceedings in response to national public 
health crises. The causes of action have been nearly identical in both sets of 
proceedings. Moreover, the end goal of both proceedings has been a largescale, 
comprehensive “master” or “global” settlement agreement purported to resolve 
a gamut of cases pending across the country. Key differences in the opioid MDL, 
however, have transformed the MDL into a truly one-of-a-kind proceeding.  
1. County and City Plaintiffs Instead of Attorney General Plaintiffs 
Unique to the opioid MDL is that counties and cities, rather than state 
attorneys general, are the primary government plaintiffs spearheading the 
litigation.54 As of October 2019, the plaintiffs included more than 2,500 cities, 
counties, tribal communities, and individuals spanning throughout the United 
States, though the vast majority of the plaintiffs are counties and cities. 55 This 
is to the great disdain of state attorneys general, many of whom are keen to enter 
into a global settlement agreement that would distribute funds to state coffers 
rather than grant proceeds directly to counties and cities.56  
2. Early Exits: Track One Settlement and Purdue Pharma’s Bankruptcy 
Moreover, unlike in the tobacco cases, which did not produce a substantial 
monetary award for any plaintiff until all the states settled for nearly $250 
billion,57 the opioid MDL has already produced an enormous settlement award 
for two plaintiffs. Compared to the tobacco cases, unique to the opioid MDL is 
the use of “bellwether” trials, or initial trials meant to set a precedent for how 
 
 53. Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman 
Announces Settlement with Purdue Pharma That Ensures Responsible and Transparent Marketing 
of Prescription Opioid Drugs by the Manufacturer (Aug. 20, 2015) (on file at the Attorney General 
press release archives). 
 54. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 1–2, 31–32. 
 55. See, e.g., Colin Dwyer, Your Guide to the Massive (And Massively Complex) Opioid 
Litigation, NPR (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/10/15/7615373 
67/your-guide-to-the-massive-and-massively-complex-opioid-litigation. 
 56. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 31–32. 
 57. See Mather, supra note 20, at 898. 
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other similarly-situated categories of MDL cases will proceed.58 The first 
bellwether trial was known as the “Track One” case,59 and the two plaintiffs 
were Cuyahoga County and Summit County in Ohio.60 Opening statements were 
set for Monday, October 21, 2019,61 with closing arguments and jury 
instructions to conclude no later than Friday, December 13, 2019.62 Then, on 
October 20, 2019, the eve of trial, four companies—Teva, Cardinal Health, 
AmerisourceBergen, and McKesson—settled with Summit and Cuyahoga 
Counties for $260 million.63 Prior to the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, 
no county, city, or other plaintiff had prevailed in such a case against Big 
Tobacco.64  
Big Tobacco litigation also did not see the bankruptcies of the biggest 
defendant-manufacturers named in the proceedings, as the opioid MDL has seen 
with the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma. September 15, 2019 marked a 
momentous day for the opioid MDL and for the history of the pharmaceutical 
industry: Purdue Pharma, a company whose origins stem back to 189265 and 
whose aggressive marketing tactics for OxyContin were alleged to have ignited 
the opioid epidemic,66 announced that it would file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.67 
As part of the settlement, the notorious Sackler family agreed to relinquish 100% 
control of the company and pay out a minimum of $3 billion in cash to plaintiffs 
over the following seven years.68 The family also agreed to restructure the entity 
 
 58. See Sarah K. Angelino & Stephen M. Copenhaver, Why Bellwethers Matter in the Opioid 
MDL, SCHIFF HARDIN PUBLICATIONS (June 10, 2019), https://www.schiffhardin.com/insights/pub 
lications/2019/why-bellwethers-matter-in-the-opioid-mdl. 
 59. Order Regarding Track One Trial Plaintiffs at 1, MDL No. 2804 (Feb. 25, 2019) (No. 
1392). 
 60. Id. Originally, three cases were included as the Track One cases: (1) The Cty. of Summit, 
Ohio v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-OP-45090 (N.D. Ohio); (2) The Cty. of Cuyahoga v. Purdue 
Pharma L.P., No. 17-OP-45004 (N.D. Ohio); and (3) City of Cleveland v. AmerisourceBergen Drug 
Corp., No. 18-OP-45132 (N.D. Ohio). Case Management Order No. 1, supra note 8, at 6. However, 
the City of Cleveland was removed from the Track One cases and joined with the City of Akron. 
Together, Cleveland and Akron are known as the “Municipal Plaintiffs” and will receive a trial date 
after the trial date of the Track Two bellwethers (as defined in Doc. 1218). 
 61. Civil Jury Trial Order, supra note 8, at 3. A three-week trial was originally set for Monday, 
March 18, 2019. Case Management Order No. 1, supra note 8, at 8. 
 62. Civil Jury Trial Order, supra note 8, at 3. 
 63. Opioid MDL Track One Cases Settle on Eve of Openings, Joe Rice Leads Negotiations, 
supra note 13. 
 64. Mather, supra note 20, at 897. 
 65. Christopher Glazek, The Secretive Family Making Billions from the Opioid Crisis, 
ESQUIRE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a12775932/sackler-family-oxy 
contin/. 
 66. See, e.g., Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 12; Thomas, supra note 50. 
 67. Restructure: Purdue Pharma Announces Agreement in Principle on Landmark Opioid 
Litigation Settlement, supra note 11. 
 68. Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 12. 
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into a public benefit trust and sell Mundipharma, their British-based company.69 
Proceeds from OxyContin and other drugs would also contribute to plaintiffs’ 
claims and further the research and development of addiction and overdose 
drugs, which would be “donated to the public.”70 Purdue estimated its settlement 
to provide over $10 billion of aid to the opioid epidemic.71  
The company reached the agreement with twenty-four state attorneys 
general, five territories, and several lead counsels in the opioid MDL.72 Paul 
Hanley Jr., co-lead counsel for the opioid MDL, welcomed the settlement, 
stating, “A journey of a thousand miles starts with the first step,” and he hoped 
the settlement would forge support for communities across the nation that have 
suffered from the opioid crisis.73 
3. Negotiation Class 
Further differing the opioid MDL from any other case in United States 
history is Judge Polster’s unprecedented Negotiation Class that he certified 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on September 11, 2019.74 The 
Negotiation Class seeks to encourage a global settlement between a class of 
forty-nine plaintiff representatives and thirteen defendants on behalf of every 
county and city in the United States,75 giving individual class members the 
option to opt out by November 22, 2019.76 While federal courts have 
conventionally employed Rule 23 to certify “trial class actions” and “settlement 
class actions,” Rule 23 had never been used to certify a “negotiation class action” 
until the opioid MDL.77 The Negotiation Class was a collaborative effort 
between the Special Master, experts, and parties in the opioid MDL.78 
The purpose of the Negotiation Class is to require parties to opt out of 
negotiation “prior to a settlement being reached, as is done in a normal class 
action geared toward trial.”79 The result is that class size is fixed prior to 
negotiations.80 This is in contrast to the “standard settlement class action,” which 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Restructure: Purdue Pharma Announces Agreement in Principle on Landmark Opioid 
Litigation Settlement, supra note 11. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Elizabeth Joseph, Purdue Pharma Files for Bankruptcy as Part of a $10 Billion Agreement 
to Settle Opioid Lawsuits, CNN (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/16/us/purdue-phar 
ma-bankruptcy-filing/index.html. 
 74. See generally Order Certifying Negotiation Class & Approving Notice, supra note 10. 
 75. See id. at 1–3. 
 76. Id. at 1. 
 77. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 7. 
 78. Id. at 2. 
 79. Id. at 3. 
 80. See id. 
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allows class members to opt out of the class after the parties reach a settlement.81 
The Negotiation Class quells defendants’ fears that many of the counties and 
cities would simply opt out of settlement after a global settlement is reached,82 
which would waste the time and resources spent to reach a global settlement 
agreement if the parties would still have to entertain a panoply of potentially 
significant claims.83  
The vast majority of attorneys general—including thirty-seven state 
attorneys general, the attorney general of Washington, D.C., and the attorney 
general of Guam—vehemently oppose the Negotiation Class.84 The attorneys 
general, who themselves are pursuing state-level opioid litigation and have 
implied that the claims are the province of the states rather than the cities and 
counties,85 argue that Negotiation Class will impede global settlement rather 
than promote it.86 Judge Polster rejected this argument, reasoning that the 
Negotiation Class “does not interfere with the States settling their own cases any 
way they want, and it does not stop parties in the MDL from settling in other 
ways . . . it does not stop any litigation from continuing and in no way interferes 
with the upcoming bellwether trials in this MDL. This process simply provides 
an option – and in the Court’s opinion, it is a powerful, creative, and helpful 
one.”87  
The Northern District of Ohio has created a website for the Negotiation 
Class that includes an interactive Allocation Map based on a “hypothetical $1 
billion gross settlement for Counties and Cities” spanning all fifty states, 
Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico.88 The amount to be allocated to each county 
or city is based on a metric that takes into account population and the impact of 
the opioid crisis on that locality. Of that total hypothetical $1 billion settlement, 
$150 million would be reserved for a Special Needs Fund designed to allow 
Class members to recover litigation costs or obtain additional relief for local 
impact of the opioid crisis, and $100 million would be reserved in a Private 
Attorneys’ Fee Fund.89 The website’s hypothetical settlement, after these costs, 
would leave behind $750 million for counties and cities.90  
For all of these reasons, the opioid MDL is truly an unparalleled colossus 
that cannot be squarely perfectly against Big Tobacco.  
 
 81. Id. at 2. 
 82. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 2. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 5. 
 85. Id. at 31. 
 86. Id. at 3. 
 87. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 88. In Re: National Prescription Opiated Litigation: Allocation Map, OPIOIDS NEGOT. CLASS, 
https://allocationmap.iclaimsonline.com/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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III.  WHY A GLOBAL OPIOID SETTLEMENT WILL BE FAR SMALLER THAN THE 
TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The stark differences between tobacco and opioid litigation highlight the 
unique factors underlying the opioid MDL. Three key reasons drive why a global 
settlement in the opioid MDL will be far smaller than the $206 billion tobacco 
Master Settlement Agreement: (1) opioid defendants can shift blame onto a 
number of other culpable parties, paving the way for causation defenses that 
were largely unavailable for the tobacco industry; (2) opioids have undeniable 
health benefits, leading to the medical community’s demand for drugs exactly 
like OxyContin in the years leading up to its FDA approval; and (3) the 
pharmaceutical industry is less financially viable than it outwardly appears, 
which is evidenced by a number of recent bankruptcies of opioid manufacturers. 
A. Defenses Unique to Opioids: Shifting Blame onto Other Culpable Parties 
Today, opioid plaintiffs face far more legal barriers than did tobacco 
plaintiffs.91 Drug manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies have a unique 
advantage of being able to pass blame onto the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), doctors, 
and individual consumers, all of whom have at least partially contributed to the 
opioid epidemic.92 Such arguments were largely unavailable for the tobacco 
industry, which had complete control over the manufacturing, marketing, and 
distribution of a single product.93 
1. FDA as a Gatekeeper 
One of the most significant differences between tobacco products and 
opioids lies in the FDA. Tobacco was unregulated by the FDA until 2009.94 For 
tobacco plaintiffs in the 1990s and early 2000s, the absence of regulatory 
oversight meant plaintiffs could place blame directly on tobacco companies for 
fraudulent marketing schemes.95 Additionally, tobacco plaintiffs could use the 
absence of FDA oversight to advocate for why tobacco products should be 
 
 91. Nora Freeman Engstrom & Michelle M. Mello, Suing the Opioid Companies, STAN. L. 
SCH. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/08/30/q-and-a-with-mello-and-engstrom/. 
 92. Brit McCandless Farmer, The Opioid Epidemic: Who Is to Blame?, 60 MINUTES (Feb. 24, 
2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-opioid-epidemic-who-is-to-blame-60-minutes/. 
 93. Jan Hoffman, Payout from a National Opioids Settlement Won’t Be as Big as Hoped, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/health/national-opioid-settle 
ment.html. 
 94. See generally Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 
(2009); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
 95. See generally U.S. v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 839, 899–900 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(holding that substantial evidence established the defendant tobacco companies violated RICO by 
engaging in a massive fifty-year scheme to defraud the public, including consumers of cigarettes). 
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regulated by the FDA.96 Opioids, however, are subject to rigorous FDA 
oversight from the initial drug application and approval process all the way 
through post-approval monitoring.97 Congress has empowered the FDA to 
ensure that new drugs are both “safe” and “effective” before they may be 
introduced in interstate commerce.98 
Drug companies have thus been able to successfully argue immunity 
because of the FDA’s ultimate authority to approve new drugs.99 Under 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Community, state law claims alleging that drug 
companies committed fraud on the FDA are preempted by the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).100 The Court explained this is because the 
FDCA empowers the FDA alone, not the states, to police and investigate 
suspected fraud.101 Buckman’s reasoning was reaffirmed and extended in Riegel 
v. Medtronic, Inc., where the Court held that the FDA’s premarket approval 
process satisfies federal safety requirements and that common law claims of 
negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty are preempted by the FDCA.102 
Even before Buckman and Riegel, drug manufacturers were able to prevail on 
similar arguments. For example, under one Michigan law, drug manufacturers 
enjoyed an absolute defense from product liability suits (which, in Michigan, 
include fraud and misleading marketing claims) if: (1) the FDA approved the 
safety and efficacy of the drug and (2) “the drug and labeling were in compliance 
with [the FDA’s] approval at the time the drug left the control of the 
manufacturer.”103 
 
 96. In Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 216, the court referenced in its more than 1,600-page 
opinion the FDA’s Final Rule that “[a]ll major public health organizations in the United States and 
abroad” recognized that nicotine in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco was addictive (citing 1996 
FDA Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44619 (Aug. 1996) at xv, XVA1242326-3211 at 
2572 (US 64323)). Addiction was used by the FDA to argue that nicotine should be considered a 
drug subject to FDA regulation. See id. 
 97. See generally, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 355-360 (2018). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See generally Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001); Riegel 
v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 345 (2008). 
 100. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353. 
 101. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348. 
 102. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323–30. While Buckman and Riegel involved medical devices rather 
than prescription drugs, courts have applied the same reasoning to suits against drug manufacturers. 
Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 965–66 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that preemption 
under Buckman applies not only to medical device claims, but to drug claims as well). 
 103. Garcia, 385 F.3d at 963–64; Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946 (1996). In Garcia, the Sixth 
Circuit held that the Michigan statute was wholly preempted under the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Buckman. Garcia, 385 F.3d at 965–67. The Buckman preemption had the effect of preventing 
claims arising under the Michigan statute from being brought at all in Michigan state court. This 
was to the vast benefit of drug companies—drug companies went from being granted immunity 
under state law, to then being granted federal preemption. 
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Perhaps even more simply, drug manufacturers can argue FDA approval 
means there is a gatekeeper to blame when drugs with adverse effects reach the 
public. The FDA itself touts, “American consumers benefit from having access 
to the safest and most advanced pharmaceutical system in the world. The main 
consumer watchdog in this system is FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER).”104 When a drug manufacturer develops a new drug, the drug 
must undergo preclinical animal testing;105 followed by an “investigational new 
drug” application;106 followed by three phases of human clinical trials;107 
followed finally by an “NDA,” or new drug application, which, if approved by 
the FDA, ensures that the drug’s health “benefits exceed the risks.”108 During 
the three phases of human clinical trials, approximately seventy percent of drugs 
qualify to pass from Phase I to Phase II, and only about thirty-three percent of 
those remaining drugs are able to move from Phase II to Phase III.109 After 
undergoing such a strenuous approval process, it is difficult to convince a jury 
that an FDA-approved drug is defective.110 In 2016, Purdue Pharma was able to 
cite over twenty years of scientific research, including over a dozen controlled 
clinical studies, supporting the FDA’s approval of its twelve-hour dosing for 
OxyContin extended-release tablets.111 Purdue stated its warning label was 
updated more than thirty times and that “at no point did FDA request a change 
to [OxyContin’s] dosing frequency.”112 Such statements only lend further 
credence to pharmaceutical companies’ ability to use the FDA as a shield to 
liability.  
2. DEA as a Sleeping Watchdog 
In addition to FDA approval of opioids is DEA oversight of them. The 
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 required drug manufacturers and distributors 
to report their controlled substance transactions directly to the U.S. Attorney 
General, and in turn, the Attorney General delegates that authority to the DEA 
(an arm of the U.S. Department of Justice).113 The database by which drug 
companies report that information is known as the Automation of Reports and 
 
 104. Development & Approval Process (Drugs), FDA (June 13, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ 
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm. 
 105. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(5) (2018). 
 106. Id. § 312.20(a). 
 107. Id. § 312.21(a)-(c). 
 108. Id. § 314.50. 
 109. Step 3: Clinical Research, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approv 
als/Drugs/ucm405622.htm. 
 110. Engstrom & Mello, supra note 91. 
 111. E.g., Harriet Ryan, Purdue Pharma Issues Statement on Oxycontin Report; L.A. Times 
Responds, L.A. TIMES (May 6, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/projects/purdue-response/. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS), DEA, https://www.dea 
diversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2020). 
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Consolidated Order System (ARCOS).114 “ACROS is an automated, 
comprehensive drug reporting system which monitors the flow of DEA 
controlled substances from their point of manufacture through commercial 
distribution channels to the point of sale or distribution at the dispensing/retail 
level - hospitals, retail pharmacies, practitioners, mid-level practitioners, and 
teaching institutions.”115 ACROS accumulates these transactions and 
summarizes them into reports that give federal and state government agencies 
information necessary “to identify the diversion of controlled substances into 
illicit channels of distribution.”116 Such information can then be used by U.S. 
Attorneys and the DEA to prosecute drug crimes.117 
In July 2019, undisclosed ARCOS data were brought to light that revealed 
the DEA knew America’s largest drug distributors had released seventy-six 
billion oxycodone and hydrocodone pills throughout the United States between 
the years 2006 and 2012.118 During that period, ARCOS had tracked the “path 
of every single pain pill sold in the United States—from manufacturers and 
distributors to pharmacies in every town and city.”119 The ARCOS data revealed 
a number of red flags suggesting that high volumes of pills violated federal law, 
and patterns indicated that the opioids were being diverted to the black 
market.120 The three states with the highest concentrations of opioid pills per 
person were West Virginia with 66.5 pills per person, Kentucky with 63.3 pills 
per person, and South Carolina with 58 pills per person—numbers that far 
exceeded reasonable use.121 The DEA had sole access to this data for years and 
failed to act on it or release it.122  
Six distributors were responsible for the distribution of seventy-five percent 
of the pills: McKesson Corp., Walgreens, Cardinal Health, AmerisourceBergen, 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Scott Higham et al., 76 Billion Opioid Pills: Newly Released Federal Data Unmasks the 
Epidemic, WASH. POST (July 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/76-
billion-opioid-pills-newly-released-federal-data-unmasks-the-epidemic/2019/07/16/5f29fd62-
a73e-11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.html. Discovery during the opioid MDL revealed the 
possibility that the ARCOS data would be key to litigation. In June 2019, the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals agreed to make the ARCOS data public after a push from media, primarily from The 
Washington Post. See, e.g., Joseph F. Rice, Sixth Circuit Ruling Regarding ARCOS Data in the 
Opioid Litigation Is Welcome, MOTLEY RICE LLC (June 20, 2019), https://www.motleyrice.com/ 
blogpost/arcos-data-opioid-litigation-sixth-circuit; Opioid Litigation, MOTLEY RICE LLC, 
https://www.motleyrice.com/public-client/opioid-litigation (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 119. Higham et al., supra note 118. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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CVS, and Walmart.123 Three manufacturers, SpecGx, a subsidiary of 
Mallinckrodt; Actavis Pharma; and Par Pharmaceutical, a subsidiary of Endo 
Pharmaceuticals, manufactured eighty-eight percent of the pills.124  
After the release of the ARCOS data, drug distributors were readily prepared 
to condemn the government for failing to do more to address the crisis. 
McKesson spokeswoman Kristen Chasen responded, “For decades, DEA has 
had exclusive access to this data, which can identify the total volumes of 
controlled substances being ordered, pharmacy-by-pharmacy, across the 
country.”125 The DEA, as the overseer of drug manufacture and distribution, sets 
the quota for how many opioids manufacturers can produce and tracks where 
they can go.126 Via ARCOS, the DEA had therefore not only approved drug 
manufacturers’ production of exorbitant numbers of opioid pills, but the DEA 
also blessed distribution of those pills to pharmacies all across the country.127 
3. Physician Behavior and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Aside from government oversight, further removing manufacturers and 
distributors from the opioid crisis is physician autonomy. The FDA is primarily 
a consumer protection agency that does not regulate physicians’ behavior.128 
Therefore, while the FDA approves drug labels and recommends certain uses 
for approved drugs,129 physicians are generally free to use their own medical 
judgment to prescribe drugs for whatever medical purposes they see fit, a 
practice known as “off-label” prescribing.130 FDA drug approval also means the 
causal link between drug manufacturers’ alleged failure to warn and physicians’ 
prescribing practices is broken under the learned intermediary doctrine.131 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Higham et al., supra note 118. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Zachary Siegel, The Opioid Crisis Is About More than Corporate Greed, NEW REPUBLIC 
(July 30, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154560/opioid-crisis-corporate-greed. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physicians 
Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 
7, 28 (2016). 
 129. Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label,” FDA (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-expanded-access-and-other-treatment-options/under 
standing-unapproved-use-approved-drugs-label. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Timmons v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 8:04-CV-1479-T-26MAP, 2006 WL 
263602, at *4 (M.D. Fl. Feb. 2, 2006) (reasoning that even if OxyContin’s warning label was 
insufficient, all physicians were able to testify that they independently knew the risks of OxyContin 
addiction, and there was therefore insufficient evidence to show that the physicians were deceived 
by the defendants’ marketing. Moreover, “…the learned intermediary doctrine precluded a finding 
of causation between Purdue’s misrepresentations and/or failure to warn regarding the 
addictiveness of OxyContin…”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
106 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 13:89 
Generally, under the learned intermediary doctrine, “once a manufacturer 
warns a doctor about a drug’s inherent dangers, [the manufacturer] has fulfilled 
its legal duty to provide a warning.”132 The manufacturer’s duty to warn the 
prescribing physician displaces the manufacturer’s duty to warn patients directly 
of the drug’s inherent dangers.133 “The reasoning behind this rule is that the 
doctor acts as a learned intermediary between the patient and the prescription 
drug manufacturer by assessing the medical risks in light of the patient’s 
needs.”134 Under the learned intermediary doctrine, a plaintiff generally must 
demonstrate that: (1) the manufacturer failed to provide an adequate warning to 
the prescribing physician of the dangers inherent in the use of the product, and 
(2) the omission was the proximate cause of injury.135 
However, even if a plaintiff succeeds in proving the elements of the learned 
intermediary doctrine, the doctrine further shields a manufacturer if the 
physician otherwise acquired independent knowledge of the risks associated 
with a prescription drug.136 Where the physician’s independent knowledge is 
“substantially the same” as that which an adequate warning label would have 
communicated, the causal link between the plaintiff’s injury and the 
manufacturer’s alleged failure to warn is broken, and the plaintiff cannot 
establish proximate cause.137 Further, even where the FDA recommends more 
rigorous warnings from a manufacturer, the doctrine may bar a plaintiff’s 
recovery so long as the manufacturer warned of inherent risks associated with a 
drug.138 Every federal Circuit Court that has taken up a learned intermediary 
appeal has affirmed summary judgment or dismissal in favor of drug 
manufacturers.139 No federal case has reversed in favor of plaintiffs. 
 
 132. Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kansas v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 
2001); Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting the exception to 
the manufacturer’s duty to warn under the learned intermediary doctrine. “[W]here a product is 
properly prepared and marketed and proper warning is given to the prescribing physicians, the 
manufacturer is shielded from liability.”). 
 133. Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
 134. Eck, 256 F.3d at 1017. 
 135. See Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 136. Id. at 1192. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kansas v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1233–35 
(10th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment for the manufacturer when the manufacturer had 
already warned the hospital of a drug’s inherent risks through the package slip, but the FDA 
recommended further warnings); but cf. Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298, 299 
(Okla. 1997) (holding that a manufacturer’s “compliance with FDA warning requirements does not 
necessarily satisfy the manufacturer’s common law duty to warn the consumer”). 
 139. Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., 387 F. App’x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Avandia Marketing, 
Sales Practices and Prods. Liability Litigation, 746 F. App’x 122, 124 (3d Cir. 2018); Talley v. 
Danek Medical, Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 164 (4th Cir. 1999); Ackermann v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, 
526 F.3d 203, 214 (5th Cir. 2008); Meridia Products Liability Litigation v. Abbott Labs., 447 F.3d 
861, 869 (6th Cir. 2006); Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2003); Elhis v. 
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In addition to barring failure to warn claims, the learned intermediary 
doctrine may be used to bar plaintiffs’ false advertising claims as well. For 
example, in Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Second Circuit employed the learned 
intermediary doctrine to reject the plaintiff’s argument that “overpromotion of a 
product negates any warnings.”140 Although the plaintiff was able to point to the 
defendant’s vigorous sales campaign for the drug that was aimed at the doctor, 
there was no evidence that the manufacturer’s salespeople either misled the 
doctor about the link between the drug and the injury, or that the salespeople 
caused the doctor to prescribe the drug to the plaintiff.141 Instead, the evidence 
showed that the doctor’s prescription of the drug was based on the patient’s prior 
success with the drug and an assessment of the patient’s needs.142  
Few learned intermediary cases have been used against opioid 
manufacturers. However, in the ones that have, manufacturers have emerged 
undefeated. For example, in Bodie v. Purdue Pharma L.P., the plaintiff’s claims 
were barred because the prescribing physician had independent knowledge of 
the risks of OxyContin addiction.143 Similarly, in Foister v. Purdue Pharma, 
L.P., a Kentucky court adopted, for the first time, the learned intermediary 
doctrine when it barred an individual opioid addict plaintiff’s failure to warn 
claim when the warning label clearly stated that the drugs should not be chewed 
or snorted.144   
The expectation of physician responsibility has extended to criminal 
proceedings as well. In June 2018, when the Department of Justice announced 
the largest health care fraud takedown in U.S. history, 162 health care providers 
were charged for their roles in illegally prescribing and distributing opioids and 
other narcotics.145 Doctors who run “pill mills,” such as Dr. Jacqueline 
Cleggett,146 give doctors an increasingly bad reputation for contributing to the 
 
Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2004); Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 
1013, 1024 (10th Cir. 2001); Dietz v. Smithkline Beechman Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 816 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 140. Dean, 387 F. App’x. at 29. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. Cf. Tyree v. Boston Scientific Corp., 56 F. Supp. 3d 826, 833 (S.D.W.V. 2014) (holding 
that the learned intermediary doctrine would not have protected the manufacturer if it had 
advertised directly to patients, but the doctrine was controlling because the manufacturer did not 
advertise to patients). 
 143. Bodie v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 236 Fed. App’x. 511, 516, 521 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 144. Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 696 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
 145. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, National Health Care Fraud Takedown Results in Charges Against 
601 Individuals Responsible for Over $2 Billion in Fraud Losses (June 28, 2018), https://www.jus 
tice.gov/opa/pr/national-health-care-fraud-takedown-results-charges-against-601-individuals-re 
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opioid epidemic. They also give drug manufacturers further credence under the 
learned intermediary doctrine for why doctors should know better than to 
irresponsibly—or even illegally—prescribe dangerous narcotics.  
4. Consumer Behavior 
Aside from the FDA and physicians, other issues of causation arise with 
individuals’ addiction, abuse, and criminal behavior. In 2017, West Virginia had 
the highest rate of opioid-related overdose deaths in the United States, with a 
rate of 49.6 deaths per 100,000 persons—more than three times that of the 
national rate of 14.6 deaths per 100,000.147 While doctors were partially to 
blame,148 the majority of those deaths were attributable to synthetic opioids and 
heroin,149 which are not created by drug manufacturers. Similar to individual 
tobacco plaintiffs, to whom courts have been largely unsympathetic,150 courts 
today take issue with awarding damages to individual drug addicts. For example, 
in Foister v. Purdue Pharma, a Kentucky court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
“victimization” mentality when they had engaged in crushing, snorting, and 
injecting OxyContin and had histories of abusing prescription medications.151 In 
Ashley County v. Pfizer, twenty individual counties in Arkansas pursued 
equitable relief against the manufacturer of an over-the-counter cold medicine 
for not taking adequate steps to prevent the cold medicine from being converted 
into methamphetamine.152 The Eighth Circuit dismissed the case, reasoning:  
Proximate cause is bottomed on public policy as a limitation on how far society 
is willing to extend liability for a defendant’s actions. As a federal court 
construing state law, we are very reluctant to open Pandora’s box to the 
avalanche of actions that would follow if we found this case to state a cause of 
action under Arkansas law. We could easily predict that the next lawsuit would 
be against farmers’ cooperatives for not telling their farmer customers to 
sufficiently safeguard their anhydrous ammonia . . . tanks from theft by 
methamphetamine cooks. And what of the liability of manufacturers in other 
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industries that, if stretched far enough, can be linked to other societal 
problems?153 
This logic is extended to cases barring plaintiffs’ recovery because of their 
own contributory negligence and wrongful conduct.154 Individual West Virginia 
plaintiffs have been unable to recover damages against drug manufacturers 
because their own behavior precludes a finding of proximate cause.155 
Taken together, all of these actors allow opioid defendants to mitigate their 
liability by breaking the causal chain of liability. This simply was not the case 
for Big Tobacco. “[F]our cigarette companies produced a single product—one 
whose dangers were undisputed.”156 Cigarettes were everywhere, and their 
impact insidious, but there was no else to blame but tobacco companies. 
B. The Relationship Between Opioids and Doctors: It’s Complicated 
Lingering behind all of this is perhaps the biggest difference: there is no 
health benefit in smoking,157 but there are undeniable health benefits to opioid 
therapy.158 As such, the medical community has a complex, longstanding history 
with opioids that came in waves of rejection and support for opioid therapy.159 
Complicating the opioid epidemic is the medical community’s position on 
opioids in the years leading up to OxyContin’s approval: that opioids were non-
addictive. In 1980, Jane Porter and Hershel Jick published a letter in the New 
England Journal of Medicine that became the basis of the medical community’s 
widespread understanding that opioid use rarely resulted in addiction.160 A 1986 
retrospective analysis of thirty-eight patients taking opioids for chronic pain 
concluded that only two of the patients misused or abused the drugs, and it 
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maintained that both patients had a prior history of drug abuse.161 That same 
year, the World Health Organization shed light on the under-treatment of cancer 
pain and suggested that opioid analgesics were an avenue by which to alleviate 
pain.162 Ronald Melzack pondered “the tragedy of needless pain” in 1990 and 
suggested that morphine should be available for patients with chronic pain rather 
than remain limited to cancer patients.163  
Thus, when the FDA first approved OxyContin (“oxycodone controlled-
release”) in 1995,164 it was in response to the medical community’s demand for 
drugs exactly like OxyContin. This accordingly allows drug manufacturers to 
use the theory behind the learned intermediary doctrine as a basis for why it 
created the drugs in the first place: doctors had concluded that opioids were safe, 
doctors wanted to prescribe opioids to their patients, and doctors are better suited 
than drug companies to decide what is best for patients. Pharmaceutical 
companies like Purdue can therefore argue, in a sense, that necessity bred 
innovation. 
Immediately following the FDA’s approval of OxyContin, the American 
Pain Society launched its campaign for “pain as the fifth vital sign,” which the 
Veteran’s Health Administration adopted in its policies.165 In 1997, the 
Federation of State Medical Boards released statements acknowledging that it 
would lessen its control over physicians’ prescriptions of opioids, which the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Agency fully endorsed.166 In 2000, The Joint Commission 
(TJC) published strict standards for pain management in hospitals that 
recommended physicians rely on patients’ self-reported pain score, and those 
standards required an “acceptable” pain score before a patient could be 
discharged from post-anesthesia care units.167 In response, physicians 
aggressively prescribed opioids out of fear that failure to meet TJC standards 
would result in withholding of federal funds for their hospitals.168 Through 
enforcing TJC standards, hospitals all but forced the overprescription of opioids 
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in efforts to remain compliant with TJC and boost patient satisfaction scores.169 
This was particularly dangerous when hospitals tied their physicians’ 
compensation to patient satisfaction scores.170  
With the institutionalized dogma of what constituted best medical practices 
for pain management, an entire generation of doctors had fostered a deep-seated 
habit of aggressive opioid prescription. Then, as soon as the medical consensus 
changed and doctors concluded that opioids were addictive, drug manufacturers 
were readily able to argue under the learned intermediary doctrine that doctors 
should have known better than to irresponsibly prescribe opioids.  
C. Big Pharma: A Different Financial Ball Game than Big Tobacco 
Another glaring factor drives why a global opioid settlement will be far 
smaller than the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement: Big Pharma simply has 
less money than many think it does. In 2016, U.S. tobacco sales totaled $94.4 
billion, while prescription opioid sales only totaled $8.5 billion.171 Meanwhile, 
in 2016, Big Tobacco generated nearly $20 billion in net profits (emphasis in 
original).172 Annual prescription opioid sales amount to even less than the $9.1 
billion that Big Tobacco spends each year just on marketing and advertising 
alone.173  
Experts estimate that if all national distributors paid an amount proportional 
to the quantity of opioids they distribute to their own pharmacies (the 
determination of how distributors are generally sued), the amount would be 
about $13.8 Billion total.174 Three drug distributors (AmerisourceBergen, 
Cardinal Health, and McKesson Corporation) and two manufacturers (Johnson 
& Johnson and Teva) have tentatively proposed a $48 Billion settlement, much 
of it to be paid out over eighteen years.175 However, about half of that amount is 
an assessment of the value of addiction treatment and services that the 
companies vow to provide in the future.176  
Manufacturers similarly do not have the assets to produce a tobacco-like 
settlement, and they perhaps have even fewer assets than distributors. When 
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Purdue Pharma filed for bankruptcy and agreed to pay out a minimum of $3 
billion in cash over the next seven years, several states, including Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, and New York, vehemently opposed the settlement.177 These 
states sought to hold the Sackler family personally liable, alleging that the family 
used Purdue to transfer billions of dollars to shell corporations and private 
accounts.178 Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro said the settlement 
was a “slap in the face to everyone who has had to bury a loved one due to this 
family’s destruction and greed” and that it “allow[ed] the Sackler family to walk 
away billionaires and admit no wrongdoing.”179  
From the outset, the Sackler family does appear enormously wealthy. There 
is a Sackler Wing at New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art; other Sacker 
wings at the Louvre and the Royal Academy; Sackler museums at Harvard and 
Peking Universities; a Sackler Center at the Guggenheim; even a species of pink 
rose and an asteroid are named after the Sacklers.180 Forbes named the Sackler 
family the nineteenth richest family in America in 2016, estimating a net worth 
of $13 billion.181 However, this merely demonstrates that all of the Sackler 
family’s personal wealth and Purdue’s assets combined would still fail to even 
approach the $206 billion tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. Purdue’s 
bankruptcy thus reflects the simple reality that opioid manufacturers lack the 
financial ability to resolve the estimated $2.5-trillion cost of the opioid 
epidemic.182  
Purdue’s bankruptcy and agreement to pay out just $3 billion also created a 
strategic defense for other companies: settle early, file for bankruptcy if 
necessary, and do it for less than $3 billion. Simply put, when Purdue Pharma—
the center of much discovery, litigation, and negative publicity183—settles for 
only $3 billion, it stands to reason that the remaining defendants will argue that 
they should pay less than the company that developed and manufactured 
OxyContin. This is exactly what Mallinckrodt PLC did when it settled and filed 
bankruptcy for $1.6 billion in February 2020.184 
Bankrupting pharmaceutical companies also has negative public health and 
societal implications. Pharmaceutical companies are sources of life-saving 
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vaccines, drugs, and medical devices.185 In the twentieth century alone, 
pharmaceutical companies developed therapies for a number of previously 
untreatable diseases, including drugs for heart disease, arthritis, high blood 
pressure, bacterial infections, anxiety, asthma, cancer, and AIDS, in addition to 
developing the first prescription contraceptives.186 When the United States faced 
frequent polio epidemics in the early 1950s, Dr. Jonas Salk and others sought 
the help of pharmaceutical companies to ensure adequate public administration 
of the polio vaccine.187 It similarly stands to reason that when new epidemics 
and pandemics inevitably devastate future populations, the world will look to 
researchers and the pharmaceutical industry as first responders. Bankrupting Big 
Pharma would disproportionately harm more people worldover than it would 
help victims of the opioid epidemic—particularly when pharmaceutical 
companies create the very medications that help to treat opioid addiction. 
IV.  SOLUTION: AVOIDING ANOTHER BIG TOBACCO BLUNDER THROUGH 
LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION 
All of these factors demonstrate that a global opioid settlement arising out 
of the opioid MDL is inevitable, and it will likely be dwarfed by the $246 billion 
total award that the tobacco plaintiffs were able to obtain in 1998. A smaller 
global settlement, however, even as small as $50 billion, could still be 
enormously successful if the proceeds are channeled directly into evidence-
based public health initiatives at the local level.  
The opioid crisis is a uniquely local problem that impacts rural counties and 
urban cities alike.188 It is counties and cities that bear the brunt of not only 
financial costs of addiction, but also human costs of lives lost in their 
communities.189 Counties and cities view themselves as being entrusted to serve 
the health, safety, and vitality of their communities.190 They are eager to join the 
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MDL fight, in part because of state laws that limit local governments’ ability to 
recover under the types of causes of action brought in the opioid MDL.191 
The answer to better use of settlement funds therefore rests with counties 
and cities, rather than states, directly addressing the opioid crisis by enacting 
evidence-based public health initiatives in their own communities. If counties 
and cities lack the infrastructure to act alone, then similarly situated counties 
should their pool settlement proceeds from a global MDL settlement to 
implement solutions that would best suit addressing the opioid epidemic in their 
particular localities. State attorneys general should not be permitted to thwart the 
negotiations of county and city plaintiffs in the opioid MDL, nor should they be 
permitted to usurp the proceeds of a global MDL settlement.  
A. Lessons from Big Tobacco: Settlement Proceeds Going to State Coffers 
Means Little to No Spending Accountability 
The goal of a comprehensive opioid settlement must be a plan that tangibly 
addresses the opioid epidemic, not just a settlement agreement that procures the 
largest monetary award for plaintiffs and state attorneys general. This is a lesson 
that comes directly from the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. Today, over 
twenty years after the tobacco settlement, state attorneys general have allocated 
a devastatingly low proportion to the intended purpose of funding public health 
measures and smoking cessation programs. There is already some reason to fear 
the same result would ensue if attorneys general take over opioid MDL 
negotiations. 
For example, West Virginia, the state with the worst overdose rate in the 
nation,192 used funds from a 2004 opioid settlement with Purdue Pharma to 
remodel its state’s police academy by building a brand-new fitness center.193 
When Oklahoma opted out of the opioid MDL and pursued opioid defendants in 
state court, the state obtained a $270 million settlement from Purdue Pharma in 
March 2019.194 A measly $12.5 million of the proceeds went to counties and 
municipalities in Oklahoma; $60 million went to legal fees.195 In August 2019, 
Oklahoma obtained a $572 million damages award from Johnson & Johnson 
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(which was later reduced to $465 million due to the judge’s math error).196 The 
state of Oklahoma is presently entitled to receive $829 million from four 
different settlements with opioid manufacturers.197 So far, Oklahoma has spent 
none of it on addiction treatment.198 Despite this, Oklahoma’s Attorney General 
has since initiated a pursuit against opioid distributors as well.199 
Local communities, on the other hand, have already implemented on-the-
ground solutions to addressing the opioid epidemic. 
B. Evidence-Based Public Health Solutions Already Exist at the Local Level 
In response to the opioid epidemic, local leaders throughout the U.S. have 
already implemented effective solutions to fighting opioid addiction, overdose, 
and death.200 In 2018, the City of Chicago invested $225,000 in hiring and 
training community members who experienced opioid addiction to serve as 
“peer workers” and bring evidence-based treatment to the south and west 
sides.201 Chicago used an evidence-based research model that allowed these peer 
workers to disseminate overdose prevention information, distribute naloxone (an 
overdose reversal drug), and further connect members of the community with 
resources for treatment.202 As early as 2013, San Diego County created safe 
opioid prescribing guidelines for physicians.203 Boston has implemented drug 
take-back kiosks for the confidential and free disposal of unused or expired 
medications.204 Moreover, Philadelphia launched its “Don’t Take the Risk” 
campaign that discouraged people from taking opioids in the first place.205 These 
are just a few examples of local leaders taking initiative to combat the opioid 
crisis. 
The National Association of Counties and the National League of Cities 
created an action plan calling for local leaders to lead the way in the fight against 
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the opioid crisis.206 Specific actions included convening community leaders, 
educating community members about the effects of the opioid crisis, expanding 
treatment options, and fostering relationships with neighboring communities.207  
Moreover, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has 
published a report outlining evidence-based strategies for preventing opioid 
overdose as a resource for leaders who are spearheading the prevention of opioid 
abuse in their own communities.208 In that report, the CDC pointed to examples 
of community trailblazers that successfully implemented various programs.209 
The following discussion outlines some of those local initiatives that worked. 
1. Medication-Assisted Treatment in Jails 
Medication-assisted treatment (MAT) is repeatedly considered the “gold 
standard” for individuals suffering from opioid use disorder.210 The FDA has 
approved three medications for use with MAT: methadone, buprenorphine, and 
naltrexone.211 Respectively, these medications are agonists, partial agonists, and 
antagonists that drastically reduce the risk of withdrawal and overdose.212 
Methadone and buprenorphine prevent the agonizing withdrawal symptoms of 
opioids “without causing euphoria,” while naltrexone entirely blocks the effects 
of opioids.213 Decades of research have supported the efficacy of methadone and 
buprenorphine in preventing overdose.214 Early research also supports the 
effectiveness of naltrexone, though naltrexone may be less effective at treating 
some patients than opioid agonists (i.e., methadone and buprenorphine).215  
One of the biggest problems facing MAT, however, is social stigma. Opioid 
agonists are themselves opioids, and some fear that MAT is just “replacing one 
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addiction with another.”216 Admittedly, that fear is not entirely unfounded: It is 
possible to overdose on methadone and other opioid agonists, and opioid 
agonists can become addictive.217 However, the research emphatically shows 
that MAT is not a substitute to heroin or opioids.218 In contrast to heroin, which 
produces a “cycle of euphoria, crash, and craving,” methadone and 
buprenorphine produce stable levels of opioids in the brain, resulting in patients 
failing to experience a “rush” and significantly reducing their desire to take 
opioids.219 MAT accordingly allows individuals suffering from opioid 
dependence to gradually wean off opioids and achieve long-term recovery.  
The stigma of MAT decreases, however, as MAT programs are 
implemented in communities by community leaders, and specifically, by local 
law enforcement officials. Despite jail administrators and sheriffs historically 
not providing treatment for substance use disorders, the National Sheriffs’ 
Association and the National Commission on Correctional Health Care have 
encouraged jails to take the lead in implementing jail-based MAT and working 
with community leaders to provide MAT upon release.220 This is an enormous 
step in decreasing stigma for MAT from the very group that gatekeeps the 
detention of these individuals. 
Jails221 are perhaps one of the most important places to implement MAT. 
“More than 10 million individuals pass through jails around the country 
annually, with at least half of those individuals having substance use disorders, 
half of whom are opioid abusers.”222 Jails are uniquely positioned to not only 
oversee individuals as they are suffering withdrawal, but also to initiate 
treatment in a safe and controlled environment.223  
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While MAT is offered in few jails throughout the county, the impetus 
appears to be growing. For example, at New York City’s jail, Rikers Island 
Correctional Facility, treatment for opioid-dependent inmates includes both 
methadone and buprenorphine.224 In 2011, Washington County jail in Maryland 
became the first jail to administer MAT for nonpregnant women and for men.225 
In 2016, Rhode Island, which operates a combined jail/prison, became the first 
state to administer methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone to all inmates who 
experience substance use disorders.226 St. Louis County Jail in Missouri 
followed suit in July 2019, initiating its three-phase MAT program that includes 
the administration of methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone.227 
Additionally, Cuyahoga County in Ohio, one of the Track One bellwether 
plaintiffs that settled in October 2019, outlined a $900,000 plan to implement a 
MAT treatment program with methadone and buprenorphine in its jail.228  
MAT implementation in jails serves as a springboard for law enforcement 
to treat opioid addiction as a public health issue rather than a criminal issue. For 
example, when Cuyahoga County planned to allocate $900,000 to a MAT 
treatment program in its jail, it also planned to allocate more than twice that 
amount—$2.5 million—in a diversion program that kept low-level drug 
offenders out of jail in the first place.229  
2. Targeted Naloxone Distribution 
Another option is for counties and cities to distribute naloxone, an opioid 
antagonist that acts as an immediate overdose reversal drug.230 Naloxone 
“carries no risk of abuse and has no effect on individuals who do not already 
have opioids in their system,” it fosters no physical dependency, and it “produces 
no neurological or psychological effects of euphoria.”231 The CDC reports that 
naloxone distribution is most effective when it is administered to those who are 
at a high risk of experiencing or are in a position to react to overdose.232 
Naloxone is also particularly useful for rural communities, where those in the 
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midst of an overdose may face longer wait times for Emergency Medical 
Services (more commonly known as EMS).233  
A 2012 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) collected data 
from 188 local opioid prevention programs that distributed naloxone from 1996 
to 2010.234 The MMWR revealed that after these programs distributed naloxone 
to and trained 53,032 persons, the programs achieved 10,171 overdose 
reversals.235 Naloxone education and distribution thus materially helps to reduce 
opioid overdose mortality.236 
3. Syringe Services Programs 
Implementation of syringe services programs, sometimes known as “needle 
exchange” programs, also serves as another option for local implementation. 
When the Cabell-Huntington Health Department in West Virginia opened its 
syringe service program, the program helped to reduce client needle-sharing 
from above 25% to below 10% between September 2015 and March 2016 
alone.237 One Seattle study found that compared to those who did not use syringe 
exchange programs, syringe services program participants were five times more 
likely to initiate drug treatment and 3.5 times more likely to cease injection 
altogether.238 By 2014, syringe services programs operated in nearly 200 U.S. 
cities.239 
4. Academic Detailing 
Another compelling alternative is for community leaders to use the same 
marketing tactics that pharmaceutical companies use to market their products, 
but for evidence-based best practices for opioid prescribing. This is a tactic 
known as “academic detailing.” 
“Detailing” is “a structured educational strategy developed by commercial 
manufacturers of medical and pharmaceutical technologies to market these 
products to prescribers and pharmacists.”240 “Academic detailing,” on the other 
hand, “consists of structured visits to healthcare providers by trained 
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professionals who can provide tailored training and technical assistance, helping 
healthcare providers use best practices.”241 Commercial detailing overpowers 
traditional academic information sources primarily because researchers and 
others seeking to disseminate scientific medical knowledge are “rarely trained 
in effective communication strategies.”242 Academic detailing corrects the 
communication disparity by “marketing” science to clinicians in a clear and 
compelling manner.243  
Local leaders have achieved empirical success with academic detailing 
efforts. When Staten Island launched a multifaceted public health strategy that 
largely involved academic detailing in 2011, the borough saw a 29% decline in 
opioid-related overdose deaths from 2011–2013, while the overdose death rate 
remained unchanged in the four other New York City boroughs that lacked 
academic detailing initiatives.244 Two years later, in 2013, when New York City 
carried out a two-month-long academic detailing program on Staten Island for 
overdose prevention, the intervention resulted in a 12.4% decrease in high-dose 
prescribing rates.245 Moreover, after physicians in San Francisco received just a 
half-hour-long academic detailing session for naloxone, their rate of naloxone 
prescription increased eleven-fold.246  
Academic detailing serves as an option for both urban and rural areas. Since 
2013, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene has 
collaborated with the CDC to implement two academic detailing campaigns: one 
to support buprenorphine-based MAT with providers, and one to offer training 
and support to clinic staff to adopt safe opioid prescription practices.247 
Moreover, the San Francisco Department of Public Health sponsored 
California’s statewide academic detailing intervention program study, which 
supports rural counties for developing and implementing best practices for 
prescription, overdose, and buprenorphine-based MAT.248  
Taken together, all of these local actions show that communities are highly 
capable of implementing on-the-ground action in their localities.  
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C. The Spirit of the Opioid MDL Was to Include Counties and Cities, Not 
States 
It was by no accident that the opioid MDL amassed over 2,500 plaintiffs, 
most of which were counties and cities across the U.S. This litigation strategy 
appears to have been a deliberate effort to address the very spending shortfalls 
associated with the attorney general plaintiffs of Big Tobacco litigation. As such, 
counties and cities, rather than states, should be the parties responsible for 
obtaining a global settlement and for spending the money as they see fit in their 
communities. 
This is not to say that counties and cities are immune to corrupt or otherwise 
inappropriate spending of settlement proceeds. Precisely because of the known 
spending shortfalls of the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, plaintiffs in 
the opioid MDL have a responsibility not merely to achieve the largest possible 
settlement for their clients, but rather to pave the way for effective use of 
litigation proceeds. Any global opioid MDL settlement must be transparent, 
there must be spending accountability, and the money must go toward legitimate 
efforts aimed at abating the opioid epidemic.  
Nonetheless, counties and cities have been the most directly impacted by 
opioid addiction, withdrawal, and overdose, and they are best equipped to devise 
on-the-ground solutions. Cities and counties deploy first responders to overdose. 
Local hospitals and treatment facilities provide medical assistance to victims of 
opioid dependence. When individuals die of overdose, they are viewed as lost 
members of communities, not of states. Local law enforcement officials arrest 
and prosecute those who distribute opioids, are opioid dependent, or both. 
Settlement funds would thus best be served by directing proceeds directly to 
counties and cities, many of which already have opioid programs in place, rather 
than to the far-removed state level. 
As Judge Polster reflected, the solution to addressing the opioid epidemic 
“is not just moving money around, because this is an ongoing crisis.”249 
“Moving money around” would seem to be the precise outcome of an MDL 
settlement if state attorneys general overthrow MDL settlement negotiations. 
Early examples of this are West Virginia, which used opioid settlement funds to 
remodel its states police academy, and Oklahoma, which still has yet to allocate 
any of its $800 million in opioid settlement proceeds to any meaningful public 
health action on opioids. This is juxtaposed against Cuyahoga County in Ohio, 
which immediately had an allocation plan for a settlement the same month that 
it settled the Track One case in October 2019.250 Prioritizing county and city 
plaintiffs during the opioid MDL does not mean eliminating states entirely from 
the opioid conversation, but it does mean ensuring that counties and cities are 
heard during negotiations and that they actually receive the money they deserve. 
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Judge Polster further contemplated, “ideally, [solving the opioid epidemic] 
should be handled by the legislative and executive branches, our federal 
government, and our state governments.”251 “The federal court is probably the 
least likely branch of government to try and tackle this, but candidly, the other 
branches of government, federal and state, have punted. So it’s here.”252 Maybe 
Judge Polster is right. Maybe this should have been handled by other branches 
of government. However, where the other branches and the states failed to act, 
either by legislation or by litigation, local governments stepped up to the plate. 
It would be an insult to proactive counties and cities to usurp them of their 
opportunity to achieve a global MDL settlement simply because state attorneys 
general—who have already demonstrated they are incapable of appropriately 
distributing such proceeds—commandeered the very litigation efforts that they 
failed to initiate. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The lesson from Big Tobacco litigation is that procuring enormous 
settlement awards, while imposing no spending accountability, is a sheer waste 
of resources that insults the victims of a deadly public health crisis. Counties and 
cities spearheaded the opioid MDL precisely to avoid the shortfalls of attorney 
general plaintiffs involved in Big Tobacco litigation. For state attorneys general 
to sabotage opioid MDL settlement negotiations at the eleventh hour would be 
to effectively strip local governments of the opportunity to launch meaningful 
solutions that would best suit their communities and save lives. 
The opioid MDL is a truly unique opportunity to gather brilliant minds and 
influential stakeholders in one place to create meaningful answers to this public 
health crisis. We owe it to the local governments trying to solve the crisis—and 
all those who have been affected by opioid addiction—to grant proceeds directly 
to those parties capable of implementing on-the-ground solutions to the opioid 
epidemic. Public health is a public responsibility. Aren’t local governments also 
“the public”? 
ASHTON K. DIETRICH* 
 
 
 251. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 9:25-10:1-3. 
 252. Id. at 4:13-16. 
* Juris Doctor, Saint Louis University School of Law (anticipated May 2020); Bachelor of Science 
in Health Management, Saint Louis University (May 2017). This Note is published with enormous 
gratitude to my mentor, Professor Robert Gatter, for his guidance throughout the writing and re-
writing process. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their endless support. Finally, 
I would like to thank the Staff and Editorial Board of Volume 13. Their unconditional patience, 
dedication, humor, and humility have made the publication of this Note and Volume possible. It 
has been my honor to serve as their Editor-in-Chief. 
